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INTRODUCTION 
For ages, the belief that conflicts are won by strong actors has 
seemed to be an incontestable tenet. Moreover, reality tended to 
confirm that dogma. However, in the second half of the 20th 
century, the situation changed, and the weak started to gain the 
advantage. It was caused by several, among which the most 
important are: globalization and the identity crisis that it has gen-
erated, and the fact that weak actors have moved away from 
hierarchical and centrally governed organizational structures and 
adopted new irregular warfare strategies. In this respect, the fol-
lowing questions arise: Will this trend continue? What will it lead 
to? How will it influence the threat level? Will it contribute to the 
emergence of new threats? 
The above questions constitute the context of the discussion 
about the growing threat of space terrorism.  
In the time of accelerating space technologies development (e.g., 
reusability of rocket boosters, new rockets under testing and 
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development, including SpaceX‘s Falcon Heavy and BFR, 
NASA‘s SLS, Blue Origin‘s New Shepard), progressive number 
of launches (52 orbital launches in 2005, 70 – in 2010, 114 – in 
2018, and planned 173 for 2019), growing space industry mar-
ket (currently estimated around $350 billion, expected to almost 
triple in 2040, and reach $2.7 trillion in 30 years) space terrorism 
becomes to be recognized by many researchers and policymak-
ers as a serious threat. In other words, space systems become 
more affordable, more available, more disseminated, easier to 
manage, but also more vulnerable to be targeted by traditionally 
weaker actors like terrorist groups. 
The motivation for such potential terrorist acts mirrors the one 
for aviation terrorism but would have a more significant impact 
due to its exceptional symbolic weight, probably greater media 
exposure, and enormous economic consequences for the target-
ed agency/company, and nation. 
The main purpose of the paper is to briefly introduce the phe-
nomenon of space terrorism in the context of irregular warfare as 
carried out by traditionally weak actors that are terrorist groups 
and individuals. It is divided into three main sections, where the 
first one is dedicated to discussing how historically speaking 
weak actors started to gain advantage over the strong ones 
thanks to implementing new organizational and management 
solutions like leaderless resistance, the second – to introduce the 
concept of space terrorism and to list and describe plausible rea-
sons for carrying out a terrorist attack on space industry; the third 
and final part discusses the potential and actual threats of space 
terrorism.
WEAK ACTORS AND LEADERLESS RESISTANCE 
For ages, it was believed that the basis for the military success is 
a material advantage that would usually manifest itself in the 
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number of troops, the quantity and quality of weapons, efficien-
cy of the logistic support and economic capability of the state. It 
was, of course, strong actors, mainly states, who enjoyed such 
material advantage, so they usually won the conflicts1. Ivan Ar-
requin-Toft in his paper How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of 
Asymmetric Conflict (2001) demonstrates that in the majority of 
asymmetric conflicts2, i.e., such where the difference of potentials 
is 1:10, the strong adversary3 usually wins (70.8% of conflicts). 
That means that it did not win 29.2% of them, i.e., it was not 
able to realize the goals it adopted. 
However, in the second half of the 20th century something 
changed. The weak actors, doomed to failure from the start as it 
seemed, began to gain an advantage. In 1950-1998 the weak 
actors won 55% of wars, which denied the dogma of the simple 
correlation between material power and strategic advantage. 
 
 
Figure 1: The percentage of victories in asymmetric wars 
depending on the type of actors in particular periods. 
(Source: Arrequin-Toft, 2001: 93-128). 
                                                          
1  Winning the conflict means, in this instance, to realise the adopted goals. 
2  The basis for I. Arrequin-Toft‘s consideration was an analysis of 197 armed conflicts 
that took place in 1800-1998 (2001: 93-128). 
3  A strong adversary is, according to I. Arrequin-Toft, such an actor, whose material 
potential tops the potential of its adversary or adversaries at least ten times; and conf-
lict is defined as war, during which the number of casualties amounts to at least one 
thousand.  
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Why did it happen this way? Why did weak actors start to win 
more and more frequently despite their military potential that 
condemns them to lose? Since the real power (i.e., such that 
translates into a real victory in conflicts) is more and more often 
on the side of the potentially weaker, what fosters such a state of 
affairs? 
Making an attempt to answer these questions, we would like to 
turn attention to two factors that, as it seems, have played a key 
role here, namely, abandoning by the weak actors hierarchical 
and centrally governed organizational structures and employing 
new communication technologies. These two factors are strongly 
mutually interconnected, although the first one, it has to be ad-
mitted, has a much longer history. 
The postulate to reject centralized organizational structures oc-
curred already in the 1950s thanks to Colonel Ulius Louis 
Amoss, a CIA officer, who believed that fight against com-
munism should be founded on uncentralized, that is such, where 
the unifying element is not the leader but the shared goal (both, 
of ideological and tactical nature) (Bayo, 1963). Louis Beam, an 
American right-wing radical activist, expressed similar views and 
claimed that it was high time to give up the pyramidal organiza-
tional forms and consider other ways of organization that could 
be best defined as an organization without organization (Beam, 
1992). An organization without organization, usually called 
―leaderless resistance‖ is a strategy (and at the same time a new 
form of organization) that presupposes giving up all hierarchical 
structures that are exchanged with a loose configuration of small 
and autonomous cells, which are not governed by any decision 
center. The factor that cements the movement is the ideology, 
from which its members obtain information on effective and 
morally proper forms of combat. 
The advantages of that form of fighting (and at the same time 
organization) are significant, especially when it comes to security. 
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It is well known that in a hierarchical structure if a police agent or 
an intelligence gathering individual succeeds in infiltrating a par-
ticular level of organizational hierarchy, they will, with no prob-
lems, destroy all levels below and will endanger the levels above 
their own. It is only a matter of time and the effectiveness of the 
individual who is dismantling the given organization when it will 
be taken control of (usually also destroyed) by adverse powers. 
In the case of ―organizations‖ where single individuals or small 
groups have no organizational center, but also act without any 
structural connection between them, the threat of invigilation 
drops off practically to zero. For, in such circumstances, there is 
nothing to invigilate (there is no structure that could be subject to 
invigilation). There are more benefits to this form of organiza-
tion. The leaderless resistance model also allows to dissociate 
from unwanted actions with an excuse that they do not fulfill 
ideological criteria and adopt as one‘s own acts that suit the 
adopted pattern of direct actions but were carried out by some-
one else and fueled by entirely different motivation. In such a 
case, it is the type of action that prejudice, whether a particular 
act will be included in the activity of a particular agent. Such an 
―organization‖ may hence seem much more powerful than it is 
in reality. 
Although the strategy of leaderless resistance already appeared 
in the 1980s, it started to be widely used at the end of the 1990s. 
The reason for that was the Internet that enabled unlimited 
communication. It not only facilitated instant information ex-
change but also efficient management of ideology that in the 
leaderless resistance model plays the role of the only organiza-
tional cement. Moreover, the Internet not only allows to success-
fully maintain the anonymity of the network members but it also 
unifies them ideologically (the strength of the interpersonal con-
tacts does not seem to be weaker, than in real life interactions) 
and enables unlimited ―organizational‖ activity; the activity that 
is beyond any type of formal structure. Internet webpages play a 
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key role here; they are nodes that facilitate in information ex-
change and at the same time centers of ideological influence. 
The activists that act under the name of a particular organization 
(what of course does not mean a formal membership) dissemi-
nate the information about their activities with the use of anon-
ymous, often encrypted messages, which are then published on 
the webpages (one can find there detailed clues regarding securi-
ty rules and information encryption). Thanks to the Internet, it is 
also possible to disseminate extremist messages all over the 
world. In the past, there was a limited number of potential recip-
ients within reach of any radical idea. Looking for them and 
convincing them was in itself a risky endeavor. Today, finding 
them (which is relatively safe) with the use of the Internet is not a 
problem.4 Finally, the Internet may be used for offensive purpos-
es, e.g., in attacks the information systems or the adversary‘s 
data. Such practices are usually called ―cyberterrorism.‖ In the 
situation when offensive actions are combined with the function-
ing in accordance with the leaderless resistance model, the effec-
tiveness of a given ―organization‖ seems to be formidable. 
SPACE TERRORISM AND WEAK ACTORS 
Terrorism is a very complex phenomenon that undergoes con-
stant changes in time – it is rather of dynamic and ephemeral 
nature than fixed once for all state of affairs. Due to that reason, 
as well as to the fact that it is also politically relevant what actions 
we actually name ―terrorism,‖ there is no one definition of terror-
ism. Of course, it does not mean that there are no attempts to do 
it – there are, but they are inevitably very general and oversim-
                                                          
4 
 Roger Eatwell, a researcher of fascism and populism, cites the following reasons for 
the Internet‘s popularity among extremists: (a) the low-cost and potentially high-
quality presentation and distribution of information, (b) the ability to tailor messages to 
specific audiences who self-select the type of information they seek, (c) the ability to 
create an effective image of ideological community, and (d) the ease of global distribu-
tion across jurisdictional boundaries (Jewin, 2002: 965). 
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plifying. Moreover, there are more than one hundred definitions 
of terrorism that quite often contradict one another. A. Schmid 
and A. Jongman carried out a meta-analysis on account of 
which they stated that among the most common factors consti-
tuting terrorism there were violence and force – 83.5% of defini-
tions, political character of the phenomenon – 65% of defini-
tions, and fear and terror – 51% of definitions (Schmid and 
Jongman, 2017: 5). 
We can conclude that brief terrorism presentation with the claim 
that there cannot be one definition of terrorism. Still, it does not 
mean that we are helpless, on the contrary, a good strategy 
seems to be to forget about trying to confine such a convoluted 
issue in one definition and construct narrower and more detailed 
elucidations that describe and are dedicated to particular types of 
terrorist activities. 
There are, of course, many criteria one may use to distinguish 
among different types of terrorism. (Below, we discuss three 
most common set of criteria that in no way exhaust the variety of 
different sorts of terrorism.)  
Politically motivated terrorism can be divided on account of var-
ious doctrinal assumptions and ideological goals, and hence, 
there are, e.g., national liberation terrorisms, left-wing terrorisms, 
right-wing terrorisms, religious terrorisms. 
Due to the area of operation, terrorism can be divided into state 
terrorism (e.g., authorities use it as a way of fighting against 
guerrilla groups), international terrorism (e.g., aviation terrorism), 
and separatist terrorism (that aims to gain political, ethnic, or 
religious independence). 
And finally, the most significant for the purpose of this paper, the 
typology of terrorism that is built upon the differences where 
terrorist attacks occur. Here we distinguish aviation (air) terror-
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ism, maritime terrorism, land terrorism, cyber-terrorism, and 
space terrorism. 
Space terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon, and there are 
not many scholars who have put their interest into it. As far as 
we are aware, there is just one definition available in the special-
ist literature that addresses that issue. It was coined by J.R. Cain 
and defines space terrorism as ―an act of violence by one or 
more individuals or groups to prevent the development of a 
space settlement(s) and/or their aims including those of a space-
ship or space station during Man‘s exploration of space‖ (Cain, 
2016: 98). 
The definition is too narrow in its material scope and does not 
take into account the acts of violence/destruction that can take 
place on earth and have nothing to do with developing a space 
settlement but still target a generally conceived space sector, e.g. 
rocket launch sites or any part of ground infrastructure, including 
a cyber-attack. On the other hand, it is too broad because it 
counts as terrorism all acts violence or terror regardless of the 
motivation. If we adopted such a stand, then every crime against 
―the development of a space settlement(s) and/or their aims‖ 
including petty theft or vandalism would be treated as terrorism, 
and that would be, for a number of reasons, including legal 
ones, an absurd.  
Therefore, we propose our own definition, which, we believe, is 
more adequate and defines space terrorism as a purposeful and 
well thought-out act of destruction against human and/or materi-
al resources of space industry undertaken by individuals or 
groups out of ideological motivation, where space industry is 
understood as an economic sector dedicated to producing com-
ponents that go into Earth's orbit or beyond, delivering them to 
those regions, and related services. 
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Now, the question arises why the space sector would be an at-
tractive target for weak actors like terrorist groups or individuals.  
A good way to answer it is to draw an analogy between the 
space sector and civil aviation because the latter for decades has 
been subject to various terrorist attacks. J. Laskowski names four 
main reasons why it has been so, i.e., (1) extensive media cov-
erage, (2) symbolic meaning – by attacking the industry, the 
terrorist attacks the state the agency or company is registered in, 
(3) relative easiness to carry out such an attack, and (4) severe 
economic consequences (Laskowski, 2013:159-162). We can 
extend this list by the ones recognized by J. Harrison, namely 
that (5) such attacks are international events, (6) they can gener-
ate a sense of shame among the politicians of the attacked state, 
(7) they are effective (Harrison, 2012: 49-52). 
It seems that the abovementioned reason could also apply to the 
space industry and because of the unique and special character 
of it, like the amount of money involved, its symbolic signifi-
cance, and worldwide media coverage, any act of space terror-
ism would release the goals the terrorists had in mind and hoped 
for. This is also why traditionally weak actors and adversaries of 
the states like the USA, Russia, or China would be potentially 
interested in targeting the space industry of those countries. For, 
a successful attack, i.e., such that would result in death and/or 
bring a lot of destruction to the infrastructure, would be a real 
blow to the country‘s internal and external perception, its financ-
es, and would definitely slow down the development of space 
exploration. As we can see in figure 1, all the odds are against 
strong actors and in favor of the weak ones, like more or less 
organized terrorist groups.  
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THE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL THREAT OF SPACE 
TERRORISM 
The actual threat of space terrorism is minor. It is so because the 
global space industry is still in its infancy phase – there are no 
many programs and facilities that could be attacked, and the 
existing one, due to their small number, are well guarded. How-
ever, the sector is growing exponentially. 
As already mentioned, there are new important players in the 
industry, both private companies (e.g., SpaceX, Blue Origin, 
Virgin Galactic and Virgin Orbit, Bigelow Aerospace, Rocket 
Lab), and national agencies (e.g., ISRO, China National Space 
Administration) that joined the key actors like NASA, Roscos-
mos, ESA, JAXA, and CSA. 
The current record of rocket orbital launches was established in 
1967 when 139 missions took place (Kyle, 2018). It may be sur-
prising for many readers that for over 50 years we, as a global 
community, have not beaten it. However, since the mid-200s we 
have observed a constant growth in numbers (52 orbital launch-
es in 2005, 70 – in 2010, 114 – in 2018), and this year, i.e., 
should finally be the one brining a new record of 173 launches 
(Kyle, 2019). 
From the economy point of view, the space market is growing as 
well. It is currently estimated to be about $350 billion, and ac-
cording to various consultancy companies, it is expected to be 
worth between $1-2.7 trillion in 2040 (Foust, 2018). 
What is more significant from the safety and security perspective 
is the fact that the space industry has been gaining more and 
more strategic importance. Nowadays, we witness an unprece-
dented process of democratization of space technologies, includ-
ing weapons, that could become a serious threat for orbital ob-
jects in the future. Obviously, weak actors are not in possession 
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of ASAT weapon systems able to destroy satellites in the orbit (as 
for today, there are just five nation-states that have that capabil-
ity, i.e., USA, Russia, China, Israel, and India); they do have 
though significant potential to disrupt / jam signals from and to 
satellites that may turn out to be lethal.  
The cases of the latter have already happened. For example, Sri 
Lankan terrorist group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 
otherwise known as the Tamil Tigers, hacked an Intelsat satellite 
and used a vacant Ku-band transponder to broadcast its mes-
sage in Sri Lanka and the surrounding region without Intelsat‘s 
knowledge for over a year (de Selding, 2007) until Intelsat de-
cided to shut down the satellite transponder in late April 2007 
(McCoy, 2007). 
There might have also been cases of sabotage. In early 2015, a 
twenty-year-old U.S. Air Force Defence Meteorological Satellite 
Program Flight 13(DMSP-F13) craft blew up. The U.S., accord-
ing to S.M. Pekkanen, attributed the event to a power failure and 
minimized its importance. However, the delay in admitting the 
event to the public caused speculations, whether it was an actual 
act of sabotage (Pekkanen, 2015). Of course, for obvious rea-
sons, it is difficult to determine what truly happened.  
Another case worth mentioning is the launch of four rogue satel-
lites on Indian PSLV launch vehicle on 12 January 2018. The 
satellites belonged to the Swarm Technologies – a space start-up 
based in California that had been denied placing them onto the 
orbit due to the small size of the devices (the concern was that 
they were too small to be tracked in space) (Christensen, 2018). 
While, as it seems, this case did not pose any danger for global 
security, it raises many questions regarding our current control 
system what is sent to the outer space. If it was possible for an 
American company to place in the orbit unlicensed satellites, it 
seems, that any other agent, including weak actors adversaries 
discussed in this paper, could do the same. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of the paper was to introduce the concept of space ter-
rorism as a new possible way of attacking traditionally strong 
actors – large national states by the weak ones, like terrorist 
groups and individuals. 
Space terrorism is definitely a new phenomenon, and as such, it 
is rather a concern of the future, than a current threat. However, 
as it was demonstrated, there have already been attempts to 
disrupt the operation of the broadly conceived space industry. 
What is more, it seems very likely that we are at the beginning of 
such activities, and the threat will be growing. Space sector oc-
curs as a very attractive target for terrorists due to its immense 
symbolic significance, potential excessive international media 
coverage, and tremendous economic damage. Therefore, all the 
involved agents (e.g., policymakers, security forces, space indus-
try staff) should become aware of that fact and act accordingly.  
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